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COMMENTS
DEPUTY-DOCTORS: THE MEDICAL TREATMENT EXCEPTION
AFTER DAVIS V. WASHINGTON
In 1991, nine San Diego children accused Dale Akiki, a mentally
and physically handicapped church daycare worker, of physical and
sexual abuse. They told child therapists that Akiki had forced them to
engage in satanic rituals and animal mutilation. Without any physical
evidence, the State charged Akiki with child sexual abuse and kidnap-
ping. None of the children appeared at Akiki's preliminary hearing,
but their hearsay statements were read into the record. They did tes-
tify at Akiki's 1993 trial: under cross-examination, their stories grew
increasingly fantastic and contradictory; one girl admitted she did not
know Akiki had done "bad things to kids" until a therapist told her so.
The jury acquitted Akiki of all wrongdoing-but only after he had lan-
guished thirty months in the county jail. According to his attorney, the
case never should have gone to court. "For four years, nobody got to
cross-examine those children .... Had they been cross-examined in a
preliminary hearing, a judge would have stopped it right there. ,,
But what if those children had never been cross-examined?
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
right "to be confronted with the witnesses against" them,2 but "victim-
1. Michael Granberry, Case Illustrates Flaws in Child Abuse Trials, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, at A3.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The text in full reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
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less" prosecutions, in which the crime victim does not testify against
the assailant, do occur.3 These victims are either unable-as with
many children-or unwilling-as in many domestic violence cases-
to aid in their assailants' prosecutions by testifying. Instead, they
"speak" in the courtroom when their out-of-court statements are ad-
mitted under statutory exceptions to the general ban on hearsay.4 For
many years, the U.S. Supreme Court reconciled these admissions with
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause by narrowing its view
of the Clause's purpose: confrontation tests the truth of a witness's
statements; therefore, if a judge determines a hearsay statement bears
sufficient indicia of truthfulness, confrontation is unnecessary. 5 Yet
the confrontation right is also a procedural guarantee 6 that satisfies a
visceral notion of fairness. Just as the Fourth Amendment would be
"an empty promise" if prosecutors could use evidence obtained
through unreasonable searches if it is highly probative,7 so too does
the right to confront one's accuser lose its value when "a mere judicial
determination of reliability" can reason it away.8
In 2004, in Crawford v. Washington, the Court reaffirmed crimi-
nal defendants' right to confront their accusers; it changed the rules
dramatically, proscribing "testimonial" hearsay absent declarant un-
availability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 9 Yet this
initial proscription was ill-defined.
3. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (child sexual abuse); Idaho
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (same); United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 484 (6th
Cir. 2005) (domestic violence); T.P. v. State, 911 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. Crim. App.
2004) (child sexual abuse); State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006)
(same); Medina v. State, 131 P.3d 15 (Nev. 2006) (rape); State v. Romero, 133 P.3d
842 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006) (sexual assault).
4. See FED. R. EvID. 801 (defining "hearsay" and associated terms); FED. R.
EvID. 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress."); FED. R. EVID. 803 (listing twenty-three exceptions to Rule 802, for
which the declarant's availability is "immaterial"); FED. R. EvID. 804 (defining "un-
available" and listing five additional exceptions to Rule 802 for which declarant un-
availability is necessary); FED. R. EVID. 807 ("residual exception" to Rule 802).
5. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64-66 (1980).
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
7. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
9. Id. at 54.
452 [Vol. 43
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In June 2006, the Court refined its new rule in Davis v. Washing-
ton, focusing on statements made in one specific situation: police in-
terrogations.' 0 The Court set new rules for when an unavailable vic-
tim's statements to police are testimonial and hence inadmissible
without prior cross-examination." But these rules reach beyond law
enforcement. 12 Davis also provides a workable framework for evaluat-
ing statements to health care professionals, whose testimony, like that
of police, can be critical to victimless prosecutions.
This Comment argues that under Davis, medical experts consulted
to prepare for trial, medical providers who have a statutory duty to re-
port certain injuries, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners, and other state-
connected health care professionals act as police agents when they
question crime victims. Where this is so, victims' statements to them
should often be inadmissible unless the victim testifies or has been
previously cross-examined. Before 2004, courts admitted these hear-
say statements under statutory exceptions for "[s]tatements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment."' 13 Now, they are only
admissible by this means if they are non-testimonial-that is, if the
victim's medical condition qualifies as an emergency, and the interac-
tion's primary purpose is to resolve that emergency. 14
What does this mean for victimless prosecutions? In child sexual
abuse cases, for instance, most victims' responses to medical profes-
sionals' queries are testimonial because no ongoing emergency exists,
and the questions primarily seek to establish past events potentially
relevant to prosecution. In domestic violence cases, many victims'
statements to health care providers are testimonial for these same rea-
10. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
11. Id.
12. Contra Allie Phillips, Health Care Providers' Roles after Crawford, Davis
& Hammon, PROSECUTOR, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 18, 19 (asserting that "the
Davis/Hammon 'primary purpose' rule [is] limited to law enforcement interroga-
tions" and hence should not apply to health care providers).
13. FED. R. EvID. 803(4); see, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 348-49
(1992). Courts have also applied the exception to statements made to nontraditional
medical providers. See, e.g., United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 581 (8th Cir.
1992) (trained social worker); McKenna v. St. Joseph Hosp., 557 A.2d 854, 858
(R.I. 1989) (fire department rescue personnel); see also FED. R. EviD. 803(4) advi-
sory committee's note (explaining the exception could embrace "statements to hos-
pital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family").
14. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
3
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sons. Thus, Davis excludes a large class of victims' out-of-court
statements and safeguards defendants' right to confrontation in victim-
less prosecutions.
To reach this conclusion, this Comment first places Davis in the
context of the Court's Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in Part II.
Part III analyzes the case itself. Finally, Part IV applies Davis to
medical treatment statements and examines how it limits their admis-
sibility.
II. DAVIS EN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees a
criminal defendant the right "to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." 5 Yet hearsay-out-of-court statements offered into evi-
dence for their truth16-has long been admissible at criminal trials
even when the declarant does not appear for a physical confronta-
tion.' 7 As at common law, modem courts nominally exclude hear-
say,' 8 but recognized exceptions to this rule abound.1 9
Before 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court perceived no contradiction
between the Sixth Amendment's explicit guarantee and hearsay's rou-
tine admission against criminal defendants. 20 Rather, in Ohio v. Rob-
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. FED. R. EviD. 801(c).
17. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Crawfords, 70 U.S. 175, 187 (1865) (hearsay evi-
dence as to pedigree is admissible); Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290, 296 (1813) (ob-
serving "there are some [hearsay] exceptions which are said to be as old as the rule
itself'); Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694), cited in White, 502
U.S. at 355 n.8 (spontaneous declaration admitted despite declarant's failure to tes-
tify).
18. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
19. See FED R. EvID. 803, 804, 807. This Comment refers to the Federal Rules
but will rely on many state court cases for illustration. The hearsay exceptions in
many states' evidence codes mirror those in the Federal Rules. See DAVID W.
MILLER, FEDERAL & CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE RULES at xi (2005); see, e.g., WASH. R.
EvID. 803, 804 (substantially echoing the Federal Rules except with respect to busi-
ness records, public records, and forfeiture by wrongdoing).
20. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("If one were to read [the
Sixth Amendment's] language literally, it would require ... the exclusion of any
statement made by a declarant not present at trial.... But, if thus applied, the Clause
would abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unin-
tended and too extreme.").
[Vol. 43
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erts, it read the Confrontation Clause to require only that hearsay evi-
dence be reliable-a requirement satisfied if a statement fell within a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception or possessed particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness. 21 As Professor Richard Friedman observed,
the Roberts test "put[] the cart before the horse, essentially asking
whether the assertion made by the statement [was] true as a precondi-
tion to admissibility." 22 A defendant's constitutional right to confron-
tation turned on "[a] mere judicial determination of reliability. '" 23
With Craviford, the Court sharply curtailed this broad judicial dis-
cretion.24 Michael Crawford appealed his state court conviction for as-
saulting his wife's alleged rapist.25 Hours after the alleged assault, po-
lice tape-recorded their station house interrogation of Crawford's
wife, Sylvia, and her statements undermined Crawford's self-defense
claims.26 Asserting the marital privilege, Sylvia refused to testify at
trial, but the jury heard her recorded interrogation. 27 On appeal, Craw-
ford argued the tape's admission violated his Sixth Amendment con-
frontation right.28 Applying Roberts, the state supreme court held the
statement's admission constitutional, but the U.S. Supreme Court
granted certiorari to confront the constitutional issue Crawford
raised.29
Sharply rebuking Roberts' "malleable standard," the Court held
that the Confrontation Clause forbids admission of "testimonial" hear-
say against criminal defendants unless (1) the declarant is unavailable
and (2) the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
him.30 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained the confronta-
21. Id. at 66.
22. Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86
GEO. L.J. 1011, 1027-28 (1998).
23. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
24. See id. at 68-69.
25. Id. at 38, 41.
26. Id. at 38-39.
27. Id. at 40.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 42.
30. Id. at 53-54, 68. The Court compared the eighteenth century civil law tradi-
tion-which permitted private examinations by judicial officers-with the Framers'
common-law heritage. Id. at 43. Their legal tradition prescribed "live testimony in
court subject to adversarial testing." Id. Because "the common law in 1791 condi-
5
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tion right was not, as Roberts implied, a substantive guarantee that
evidence be reliable, but rather a procedural one that reliability be
tested by cross-examination. 31 Because Sylvia's statement was testi-
monial 32 and Crawford had had no opportunity to cross-examine her,
its admission violated his confrontation right.33
After pronouncing this new and radically different rule, the Court
explicitly disclaimed "any effort to spell out a comprehensive defini-
tion of 'testimonial.' 34 Chief Justice Rehnquist, in concurrence, criti-
cized this deliberate evasion: "Rules of criminal evidence are applied
every day in courts throughout the country, and parties should not be
left in the dark in this manner." 35
But some light pierced the darkness. The Court's language is only
occasionally unequivocal.36 Otherwise, its reasoning, phrasing, and
tioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior
opportunity to cross-examine[,] [t]he Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those
limitations." Id. at 54. Earlier English statutes permitted out-of-court examination of
felony suspects and witnesses by justices of the peace, but by 1791 widespread
abuse had discredited these procedures. Id. at 43-44.
31. Id. at 61. "Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution ac-
tually prescribes: confrontation." Id. at 68-69 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 65-66.
33. Id. at 68.
34. Id. Instead, it illustrated the need to strictly interpret the Confrontation
Clause by describing Sir Walter Raleigh's 1603 treason trial: Raleigh was convicted
and sentenced to death after his alleged accomplice, Lord Cobham, implicated him
during a private examination by the Privy Council and in a letter-both of which
were read to the jury. Though Raleigh insisted Cobham merely hoped to secure
mercy for himself and would recant in court, the Crown never permitted Raleigh to
confront his accuser. Id. at 44.
35. Id. at 75-76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
36. Some hearsay-including "off-hand, overheard remark[s]"-is definitely
non-testimonial. Id. at 51 (majority opinion). For instance, "business records or
statements in furtherance of a conspiracy" are "by their nature ... not testimonial."
Id. at 56. Instead, the Confrontation Clause reflects an "acute concern with a specific
type of out-of-court statement"-namely, "testimonial" statements. Id. at 51. "Vari-
ous formulations of [the] core class of 'testimonial' statements exist . . . [but] all
share a common nucleus." Id. at 51-52. At a minimum, the term encompasses "prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial," as well
as statements made during "police interrogations." Id. at 68. The Court also identi-
fied "plea allocution[s], showing the existence of a conspiracy" as testimonial state-
ments "the Confrontation Clause was plainly meant to exclude." Id. at 63-64. The
6
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cited authorities reveal three factors relevant to whether a statement is
testimonial: formality, government involvement, and a declarant's ob-
jective expectations of his statement's future prosecutorial use.
First, citing an 1828 dictionary definition of "testimony"-"' [a]
solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing
or proving some fact"'-the Court reasoned "[a]n accuser who makes
a formal statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense
that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does
not."37 Such "functional equivalent[s]" of live testimony include affi-
davits, depositions, and confessions.38
These examples point to an alternative or additional consideration:
government involvement. Statements procured by government inter-
rogation, whether interrogators are police officers or magistrates,
merit particular scrutiny.39 Declining to select from "various defini-
tions of 'interrogation,"' the Court observed only that Sylvia Craw-
ford's statement qualified under any definition.40 Further, the interro-
gator's subjective intent seems to matter: where a government officer
obtains the declarant's statement "with an eye toward trial," the state-
ment is more likely to be testimonial.4 ' In discussing this factor, the
Court cited the work of Professor Akhil Reed Amar.42 Amar sug-
gested only extrajudicial statements prepared by the government for
trial-"affidavits, depositions, videotapes, and the like"-are testimo-
Court further noted the Sixth Amendment may exempt testimonial dying declara-
tions but declined to firmly decide. Id. at 56 n.6.
37. Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 52. This reasoning evokes one possible broad definition of "testimo-
nial" statements offered but not endorsed by the Court: "'extrajudicial statements...
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior
testimony, or confessions."' Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,
365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
39. Id. at 53.
40. Id. at 53 n.4.
41. Id. at 56 n.7.
42. Id. at 61 (citing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 125-31 (1997)). See also Akhil Reed Amar, Con-
frontation Clause First Principles, a Reply to Professor Friedman, 86 GEO. L.J.
1045 (1998) [hereinafter Amar, Reply] (responding to criticism of his approach).
7
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nial. 43 But he did not extend this umbrella to out-of-court statements
between private persons.44
On this point, Amar's view opposed another cited by the Craw-
ford Court: 45 according to Professor Friedman, a statement made to
another private party is testimonial when the declarant anticipates it
will likely be presented at trial.46 Yet Crawford also appears to favor a
variation of Friedman's proposal, quoting but not endorsing a "rea-
sonable declarant" standard advanced in two briefs.47
Indeed, the Court failed to endorse any of the "testimonial" for-
mulations it quoted. Hence, lower courts were left to weigh these three
concepts-formality, government involvement, and a declarant's ob-
jective expectations-with no guidance as to their overall and/or rela-
tive weight. A bright-line rule now existed: testimonial hearsay absent
unavailability and cross-examination was inadmissible. 48 But its pa-
rameters remained murky.
43. Amar, Reply, supra note 42, at 1045.
44. Id. at 1045-46. Amar explains his reasoning with a simple example:
When Abner tells his best friend Betty-before the government has even
appeared on the scene-that he saw Carl rob the liquor store, Abner is not
a Confrontation Clause "witness" simply because Betty later takes the
stand against Carl, and tells the jury what Abner told her.... Within the
meaning of both constitutional law-as evidenced by text, history, and
structure-and common sense, Betty is the "witness," not Abner.
Id.
45. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (citing Friedman, supra note 22).
46. Friedman, supra note 22, at 1039. For Friedman, "[a] statement made by a
person claiming to be the victim of a crime," must almost always be considered tes-
timonial, regardless of to whom it is made. Id. at 1042-43. Only statements made
before any crime is committed, co-conspirators' statements in furtherance of a
criminal enterprise, and statements made in the course of regular business are usu-
ally not testimonial. Id. at 1043.
47. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. Crawford contended "'ex-parte in-court
testimony or its functional equivalent ... [including] similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially"' was testimonial. Id.
at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 23). An amicus brief pointed to "'statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial."' Id. at 52
(quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici
Curiae 3).
48. Id. at 68-69.
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III. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND ITS EXPRESS IMPLICATIONS
In 2006, the Court returned to testimonial hearsay in Davis v.
Washington.49 This section examines the Court's opinion in these con-
solidated cases, focusing first on a new test enunciated therein, then
on its application to the facts in each case, and finally on two addi-
tional elements of the opinion critical to the analysis in Part IV.50
A. The Test for "Testimonial"
Crawford declared that statements made during "police interroga-
tions" are testimonial" -but what constitutes a "police interroga-
tion"? The Court offered only that it used the term "in its colloquial,
rather than any technical legal sense. 52 In Davis, the Court declined
"to produce an exhaustive classification of ... all conceivable state-
ments in response to police interrogation ... as either testimonial or
nontestimonial," but enunciated a new test to ferret out this distinc-
tion:
49. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006) (addressing both
State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 547 (2005), and
Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005)).
50. As an initial matter, the Court resolved a fundamental question raised by
Crawford: Does the Confrontation Clause apply only to testimonial hearsay? Davis,
126 S. Ct. at 2274. Quoting its previous assessment that "'[t]he text of the Confron-
tation Clause reflects this focus [on testimonial hearsay],"' the Court concludes "[a]
limitation so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly
be said to mark out not merely its 'core,' but its perimeter." Id. (quoting Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004)) (alteration in original). Thus the Confrontation
Clause's scope extends only to testimonial hearsay statements, and for these state-
ments, it mandates either courtroom confrontation or unavailability coupled with a
prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 2273-74.
51. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). As Lisa Kern Griffin, a
UCLA law lecturer, astutely points out, Davis qualifies this apparently unequivocal
statement when it refers to "determining 'which police interrogations produce testi-
mony."' Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling Around the Confrontation Clause: Redefined
Reach but Not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 18 (2006),
http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol 105/griffin.pdf (quoting
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273) (emphasis added by this author).
52. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
300-01 (1980) (defining "interrogation" to embrace "not only.., express question-
ing, but also ... any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response")).
9
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Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the cir-
cumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emer-
gency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to estab-
lish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
53
These latter statements, the Court explained, "are an obvious substi-
tute for live testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does
on direct examination. 5 4
Davis thus established a three-part formula. First, police interroga-
tion is a threshold requirement. 55 Two additional elements then distin-
guish testimonial from non-testimonial statements: the existence of an
ongoing emergency and the interrogation's primary purpose.56
But what qualifies as police interrogation? Only custodial interro-
gations, or questions posed during a Terry stop57 or posed to a non-
suspect as well? On some level, any question asked by a police officer
53. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
54. Id. at 2278. Notably, the Court minimized Crawford's emphasis on formal-
ity in this context, asserting that "[i]t imports sufficient formality... that lies to [ex-
amining police] officers are criminal offenses." Id. at 2278 n.5. Responding to Jus-
tice Thomas, who dissented in Hammon, the Court did "not dispute that formality is
indeed essential to testimonial utterance" but-rather surprisingly-Justice Scalia
reasoned that "[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against
which it was originally directed is a recipe for its extinction." Id. Professor Friedman
detects some continued uncertainty in these pronouncements but concludes "if [the
Court] continues to speak in terms of formality, the standard will be a very loose
one." Richard D. Friedman, "We Really (For the Most Part) Mean It!," 105 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 1, 4 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/first
/impressions/voll05/friedman.pdf; see also Robert P. Mosteller, Davis v. Washing-
ton and Hammon v. Indiana: Beating Expectations, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 6, 9 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mr/firstimpressions
/voll05/mosteller.pdf (concurring that formality plays a minimal role under Davis).
55. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
56. Id.
57. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that momentary seizure by a
police officer on reasonable suspicion of imminent, violent criminal activity based
on personal observations was not unreasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
460 [Vol. 43
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in the course of his duties is interrogation, or another questioner may
act as his proxy. So, how far should Davis extend?
Second, when is an emergency "ongoing"? 58 Must the declarant
be at risk, or is danger to others or to the general public sufficient?
Does imminent and probable danger suffice?
Third, whose purpose should a court examine-the declarant's or
the interrogator's? This third element has inspired the most debate.
Alone in a partial dissent, Justice Thomas criticized the primary pur-
pose inquiry, calling it "an exercise in fiction." 59 He observed that
"[i]n many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a
crime,.., the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspec-
tive of the police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and
to gather evidence." 60 The test's hindsight judgment--one "not neces-
sarily tethered to the actual purpose for which the police performed
the interrogation"-will thus be inherently arbitrary.6' Justice Thomas
logically assumed the primary purpose inquiry focuses on the police
interrogator. 62 But in a footnote, the Court instructed that even in an
58. See Friedman, supra note 54, at 4 (posing this same query).
59. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part); see also Joan S. Meier, Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence,
and the Supreme Court: The Case for Cautious Optimism, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 22, 25 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions
/vol 105/meier.pdf (dismissing Davis's primary purpose test as "a legal fiction").
60. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2283. For additional critiques of the primary purpose
test that echo this concern, see Friedman, supra note 54, at 3 and Tom Lininger,
Davis and Hammon: A Step Forward, or a Step Back?, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 28, 29 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions
/voll05/lininger.pdf. But see Memorandum from the Public Defender Service of the
District of Columbia's Special Litigation Division and Division Law Clerk Dawn
Davison to Professor Friedman and the Confrontation Blog 1 (Aug. 8, 2005), avail-
able at http://www-personal.umich.edu/%7Erdfrdman/pdsgvr.pdf [hereinafter
Memorandum] ("[Davis] strengthens the confrontation guarantee by holding that re-
ports of criminal activity made to law enforcement officers and their agents may
only be deemed nontestimonial where . . . the statements are solely directed at re-
solving [the] emergency situation.").
61. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2284.
62. Id. at 2283; see also Lininger, supra note 60, at 29 ("The test's focus [is]
on the intent of the police rather than the intent of the declarant.").
11
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interrogation, lower courts should focus on the declarant's statements,
not the interrogator's questions. 63
Early commentators have interpreted these somewhat contradic-
tory indications in various ways. Professor Robert Mosteller believes
choice of perspective will not normally dictate the result because
"[w]hen the objectively discernable purpose of the police is to estab-
lish or prove a past fact potentially relevant to criminal prosecution,
that should be readily observable to the speaker as well as the po-
lice." 64 Professor Tom Lininger predicts that a new focus on the inter-
rogator's objective will prevent investigators from circumventing the
confrontation requirement by manipulating witnesses' perceptions. 65
By contrast, Andrew Fine, attorney for The Legal Aid Society of
New York, believes any focus on the interrogator's purpose "rather
than the motive or reasonable expectation of the declarant, whose
status as a 'witness' under the Confrontation Clause is at issue . . .
creates the potential for police manipulation." 66 But Fine reads certain
language in the opinion to strongly suggest "that the declarant's rea-
sonable expectation or motive may also be important."
67
63. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1 (majority opinion); see Friedman, supra note
54, at 3 ("Why does the purpose of the interrogation matter" when the Court later
cautions "'it is in the final analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's
questions,' that are decisive under the Confrontation Clause?").
64. Mosteller, supra note 54, at 9.
65. Lininger, supra note 60, at 30 (new focus will deter police from question-
ing "declarants for investigative purposes ... when [they] are so distraught that they
are not contemplating prosecutorial use of their statements" or "contriv[ing] circum-
stances in which a plain-clothes interlocutor speaks with a child for investigative
purposes while the child... may not believe that he or she is providing information
for prosecutorial use").
66. Andrew C. Fine, Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Clause after Davis
v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 105 MICH. L. REv. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 11,
12 (2006), http://students.law.urrich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/voll05/fine.pdf (em-
phasis added). Fine suggests "it will be difficult for courts to ignore an officer's
claim that he believed the emergency to be ongoing when he questioned the decla-
rant," id. at 12, and unscrupulous officers may "question victims of domestic vio-
lence before ensuring their safety" when they fear the declarant "may subsequently
become reluctant to cooperate," id. at 13.
67. Id. In particular, Fine cites Justice Scalia's characterization of "the 911 call
in Davis [as] 'plainly a call for help"' in which the speaker "'simply was not acting
as a witness,' or 'testifying."' Id. (quoting Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77). Two foot-
notes provide further evidence, declaring "'it is in the final analysis the declarant's
[Vol. 43
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Standing alone, the Court's new test thus raises as many questions
as it answers, but its application to the facts in Davis and Hammon
provides greater clarity.
B. Davis
A Washington jury convicted Davis of violating a domestic no-
contact order after the trial judge admitted the victim's statements to a
911 operator as excited utterances 68 over Davis's Crawford-based ob-
jection.69 The victim called 911 but immediately hung up, so the op-
erator reversed the call.70 Responding to the operator's specific inquir-
ies, the victim stated Davis was "'jumpin' on [her] again"' and,
critically, provided his full name.71 Davis fled, and the operator then
posed a series of structured questions concerning his identity and de-
tails of the assault.72 Because the victim disappeared before trial and
no one else could identify Davis as her assailant, the judge admitted
an un-redacted recording of the 911 call.73 The Washington Supreme
Court affirmed, "concluding that the portion of the 911 conversation
in which [the victim] identified Davis was not testimonial," and that if
other portions were, their admission was harmless error.74
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court classified 911 operators, for
purposes of its opinion, as "agents of law enforcement when they con-
duct interrogations of 911 callers." 75 Applying its new test, however,
the Court classified responses to operators' initial questions as non-
testimonial because they are "ordinarily not designed primarily to 'es-
tablis[h] or prov[e]' some past fact, but to describe current circum-
statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires
us to evaluate,' and that 'police conduct' cannot 'govern the Confrontation Clause."'
Id. (quoting Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1, 2279 n.6).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (providing that a hearsay "statement relating to a
startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excite-
ment caused by the event or condition" is admissible).
69. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271; State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 847 (Wash. 2005).
70. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2270.
71. Id. at 2271 (quoting the record).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2271-72.
75. Id. at 2274 n.2.
13
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stances requiring police assistance."76 But, if an operator persists in
asking substantive questions after obtaining information necessary to
resolve the emergency situation or after the exigency has ended, a
caller's subsequent responses might be testimonial.77 When admitting
911 call recordings, lower courts must "redact or exclude the portions
of any statement that have become testimonial" due to such a shift in
primary purpose.
78
Continuing to the test's ongoing emergency element, the Court
indicated the operator's questions in the instant case had straddled this
line. Unlike Sylvia Crawford, the victim here "was speaking about
events as they were actually happening, rather than 'describ[ing] past
events'" 79-until Davis fled the scene, that is. The Court recognized
his departure may have triggered a critical shift in purpose.8 ° Thereaf-
ter, "[i]t could readily be maintained that . . . [her] statements were
testimonial.",81 But the Court also emphasized formality, contrasting
the calmly executed "station house" interview in Crawford with the
"frantic" phone dialogue in Davis.82 And it observed that unlike Syl-
via Crawford, Davis's victim spoke in the midst of "an ongoing emer-
gency" involving a "bona fide physical threat." 83 The 911 operator's
76. id. at 2276 (alteration in original).
77. Id. at 2277.
78. Id. The majority drew a parallel to Fifth Amendment jurisprudence: "Just
as ... 'police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between ques-
tions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect,"' lower courts should
be able to pinpoint when responses to police questions become testimonial. Id. No-
tably, the Court seemed to rest this dividing line on the nature and timing of the op-
erator's questions. See id. The operator, as investigator, directs the course of the in-
terview. If the operator asks more than is necessary to resolve the emergency,
responses are testimonial because the purpose of the exchange simply cannot be to
resolve the emergency.
79. Id. at 2276 (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality
opinion)) (alteration in original).
80. Id. at 2277 ("[Ajfter the operator gained the information needed to address
the exigency of the moment, the emergency appears to have ended (when Davis
drove away from the premises).").
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2276-77.
[Vol. 43
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initial questions, and the victim's answers to them, were needed to re-
solve that emergency.84
Commentators have sharply criticized this conclusion. Professor
Friedman asks, "[W]hy did the setting of Davis qualify as an 'ongoing
emergency,' given that by the time of the 911 call the alleged assailant
was leaving the scene ... ?,,85 Professor Joan Meier contends Davis's
name was "only minimally relevant to providing emergency assis-
tance" and disagrees with the Court's reasoning "that it is necessary to
determine if the accused is a 'violent felon,"' a fact she believes
should be obvious "from the 911 call itself.",86 The Court's analysis of
Hammon, the companion case, did not answer these criticisms.
C. Hammon
Police officers responded to a reported domestic dispute at the
Hammons' home and found a distraught Amy Hammon on the
porch.87 Though she initially voiced no complaint, she permitted the
officers to enter the house, where they saw evidence of a recent physi-
cal altercation.88 Over Mr. Hammon's strenuous objections, the offi-
cers sequestered the couple in separate but adjacent rooms for ques-
tioning, at which point Amy accused Hammon of battery and signed
an affidavit at the interviewing officer's request.89 Amy did not re-
spond to a subpoena to testify at Hammon's domestic battery trial, so
the judge admitted both the interviewing officer's testimony about
Amy's statements to him and the affidavit, as an excited utterance and
present sense impression, respectively. 90 When Hammon appealed his
84. Id. at 2277.
85. Friedman, supra note 54, at 4; see also Griffin, supra note 51, at 17 (inter-
preting this apparent factual discrepancy as evidence that the Court defines an ongo-
ing emergency to include "[a]n unspecified amount of aftermath questioning").
86. Meier, supra note 59, at 25 (quoting Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276).
87. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2272.
88. Id. The officers testified they observed a gas heating unit, surrounded by
shards of shattered glass, emitting flames from its broken cover. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2272-73; see FED. R. EvID. 803(1) (a hearsay statement "describing
or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the
event or condition, or immediately thereafter" is admissible as a present sense im-
pression); FED. R. EVID. 803(2) (a hearsay "statement relating to a startling event or
15
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conviction, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the admission of the of-
ficer's testimony and concluded admission of the affidavit, which it
found testimonial, was harmiess error.91
Professor Friedman had predicted the Court would find both
Amy's statements and the affidavit testimonial. 92 "Otherwise .... an
accuser could create evidence for the prosecution-in other words,
testify-simply by speaking to an officer in her living room, without
any need to come to court, take an oath, face the accused, or submit to
cross-examination. ' 9
3
The U.S. Supreme Court validated Friedman's prediction.94 Ap-
plying the new test, it determined both admissions were erroneous by
comparing the facts in Crawford and Davis, and zeroing in on the
"ongoing emergency" element. 95 Like the interrogation in Crawford-
and unlike the Davis 911 operator's initial questions-Amy's interro-
gation focused on past events:
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the
event or condition" is admissible as an excited utterance).
91. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
92. Friedman, supra note 54, at 2. Friedman obtained Hammon's permission to
petition for certiorari because he believed the case was "a perfect vehicle for the
United States Supreme Court to refine the meaning of 'testimonial."' Id. His as-
sessment was, of course, correct. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278. Davis's outcome de-
fied his forecasting ability, however. Friedman deemed the 911 call even less likely
to pass constitutional muster:
[Davis's victim] made an accusation of a crime to a government agent
who was a direct conduit to the police, and she did so in circumstances
that would lead any reasonable person to understand that she was invoking
the power of the state against the accused, since much of the conversation
concerned a restraining order [against] Davis .... If she or the 911 opera-
tor had been afraid that Davis would return immediately to the house, then
the obvious response would have been to send police there. But instead the
operator told her that the police would first find Davis and then come to
talk to her. In short, a reasonable person would understand that [the vic-
tim] was providing information that would be used immediately to enforce
the restraining order and might well be used later for criminal prosecution.
Friedman, supra note 54, at 2.
93. Friedman, supra note 54, at 2.
94. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
95. Id.
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There was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer testi-
fied that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one
throw or break anything. When the officers first arrived, Amy told
them things were fine, and there was no immediate threat to her
person. When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and
elicited the challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine
(as in Davis) "what is happening," but rather "what happened. 96
Addressing Amy's verbal allegations, the Court recognized that re-
sponding officers' initial inquiries-those necessary to assess a poten-
tially dangerous situation-may often elicit non-testimonial re-
sponses.9 7 But where responses are neither "a cry for help nor the
provision of information enabling officers immediately to end a
threatening situation," they are testimonial.
98
Professor Meier disputes the Court's conclusions.9 9 She contends
Amy did face an ongoing emergency, citing Hammon's attempt "to
control and intimidate" his wife while the officer questioned her, and
she warns that even "when a single [domestic violence] incident is
'over,' the danger is still ongoing." 100 Yet the Court was not wholly
insensitive to these concerns.
96. Id. (citations omitted). Responding to Indiana and the United States, which
argued as amicus curiae that Davis and Hammon should be resolved similarly, the
Court emphasized several distinctions between the cases: Davis's victim was alone
with and in immediate danger from Davis when she spoke, while Hammon's wife
was protected by police; Davis's victim spoke in the present tense and sought aid,
while Hammon's wife narrated past events after danger to her had subsided; and
Hammon's wife executed an affidavit at the interrogating officer's request for the
express purpose of establishing what had previously transpired. Id. at 2279.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2278-79. Buttressing its conclusion, the Court again turned to formal-
ity as an indicator of testimonial statements, noting the custodial setting of Sylvia
Crawford's interrogation was not dispositive to her statement's testimonial charac-
ter. Id. at 2278. Amy's interrogation "was conducted in a separate room, away from
her husband (who tried to intervene) with the officer receiving her replies for use in
his 'investigation,"' and was thus more similar to the station house interview in
Crawford than to the 911 call in Davis. Id.
99. Meier, supra note 59, at 26.
100. Id.
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D. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
Both Davis and Hammon involved domestic violence, and the
Court acknowledged that victims in such cases are "notoriously sus-
ceptible to intimidation or coercion" designed to deter them from testi-
fying. "' It brushed aside suggestions that prosecution of such crimes
necessitates "greater flexibility in the use of testimonial evidence,"'' 0 2
noting that constitutional guarantees are not subordinate to the goal of
punishing the guilty. 103 "But when defendants seek to undermine the
judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and
victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acqui-
esce."' 4 In Crawford, the Court reasoned that "the rule of forfeiture
by wrongdoing . . . extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds" and does not purport to replace cross-examination
as a means of assessing reliability. 0 5 Davis is more to the point:
"[O]ne who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits
the constitutional right to confrontation."'' 0 6 Expressly taking "no posi-
tion on the standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture," the
Court noted federal courts frequently apply the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard, and some courts admit hearsay at forfeiture hear-
ings. 10
7
Though critical of Hammon's result, Professor Meier applauds the
Court's willingness to balance Crawford's "absolute version of the
confrontation right" against "the dark realities with which domestic
violence victims and their advocates contend every day."' 1 8 Meier
101. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80.
102. Id. at 2279.
103. Id. at 2280.
104. Id.
105. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004); see FED. R. EVID.
804(6).
106. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
107. Id.
108. Meier, supra note 59, at 23-24. Indeed, the Court's comments radically
expand Crawford's oblique, approving reference to the forfeiture rule. According to
Professor Myrna Raeder, the Crawford Court's citation of United States v. Reynolds
indicated "forfeiture hearsay exceptions [were] generally limited to witness tamper-
ing." Myrna Raeder, Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Im-
pact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOKLYN L. REv. 311, 362
(2005).
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suggests the Court "effectively invites lower courts to utilize liberal
burdens of proof and evidentiary standards in making forfeiture de-
terminations," thus ensuring hearsay's continued admissibility in vic-
timless prosecutions.' 0 9 Indeed, because the forfeiture rule applies to
all hearsay statements, including those made to private persons, its use
in domestic violence and other victimless prosecutions will almost
certainly increase.
E. Statements Outside an Interrogation
In a footnote, the Davis Court cautioned that the definitions of tes-
timonial and non-testimonial hearsay it had provided were not all-
encompassing, but rather were tailored to their factual context. Indeed,
statements made outside interrogation may be testimonial because
"[t]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-
examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended ques-
tions than they were to exempt answers to detailed questioning."' 
10
According to Professor Mosteller, this suggests almost any statement
"made to known government investigative agents" is testimonial."'
Perhaps more significantly, however, the Court also indicated
statements to private parties could be testimonial-that government
involvement is no more necessary to a testimonial statement than in-
terrogation. Responding to an argument from Davis, the Court cited a
1779 English case, King v. Brasier, in which the judges reversed Bra-
sier's conviction because testimonial hearsay had been admitted." 2
There, a child sexual assault victim told her mother about the assault
"immediately on... coming home.""' 3 She later described the perpe-
trator's residence and visually identified him, but although her mother
testified at trial to the child's description of the assault, the child her-
self "was not sworn or produced as a witness." ' 1 4 Because "no testi-
109. Meier, supra note 59, at 24.
110. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1.
111. Mosteller, supra note 54, at 6, 8; cf Fine, supra note 66, at 14 (predicting
"the classification of most statements elicited by police at the scene of a domestic
disturbance as testimonial").
112. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277; King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202, 202-03
(1779).
113. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 202.
114. Id.
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mony whatever can be legally received except upon oath," these
statements' admission was error.' 1 5
Andrew Fine believes the Court's approving reference to this case
suggests "statements made to .. .private citizens may be testimo-
nial. '" 116 This Comment contends many such statements are testimo-
nial-either because the listener is a police agent, or simply because
application of the three Crawford factors inevitably leads to this con-
clusion. Part IV considers only the former situation. Supportively, one
commentator has suggested the Davis test's "logic would seem to ap-
ply as well to statements whose primary purpose is to seek medical
treatment, even where medical personnel are asking questions that
also gather investigative details."1"' Yet when medical personnel ask
such questions, they may function as police agents, and for responses
115. Id. at 202-03.
116. Fine, supra note 66, at 13 (emphasis added); see also Friedman, supra
note 54, at 5 (observing that "neither the immediacy of the statement, the youth of
the declarant, nor the private status of the audience remove[d] the statement from the
protections of the confrontation right").
117. Griffin, supra note 51, at 18. But cf Phillips, supra note 12. Writing for
prosecutors, Phillips argues that health care providers should only be treated as gov-
ernment agents when their questions serve no diagnosis or treatment function or are
dictated by law enforcement. Id. at 21, 25-26. She asserts that Davis's primary pur-
pose test applies only to law enforcement but considers governmental agency rele-
vant to the more general Crawford inquiry. Id. at 19. Citing post-Crawford cases,
she suggests that when "a health care provider ... is primarily or exclusively work-
ing . . . with law enforcement for purposes of gathering evidence of criminal activ-
ity, and ... does not engage in diagnosis or treatment of the victim, then the state-
ments made by the victim during the examination will likely be deemed
testimonial." Id. at 21. Phillips offers several prescriptions for prosecutors who seek
to introduce victims' hearsay statements through medical providers' testimony. Id. at
25-27. Though she believes the primary purpose test applies only to law enforce-
ment, she warns courts may still apply it to health care providers. Id. at 25. Where
this results in exclusion of victims' statements as testimonial, Phillips urges prosecu-
tors to restructure health care providers' protocols to better emphasize their treat-
ment function, to prepare providers to explain the medical purpose of their questions
when they testify, and to direct providers to refrain from discussing criminal prose-
cution or court appearances with victims, even when victims raise these issues them-
selves. Id. at 25-26. In her conclusion, Phillips specifically warns prosecutors
against two situations: (1) where police investigators ask health care providers to
pose certain questions to the victim "in order to develop the investigation" and (2)
where law enforcement officers are present in the medical examination room. Id. at
27.
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to be non-testimonial, they must be primarily directed to resolving an
ongoing emergency. "1
8
IV. DAVIS V. WASHINGTON AND DOCTORS AS DEPUTIES
Davis's impact on statements to health care providers is less dra-
matic than its impact on statements to police officers-but it is unde-
niable. This Comment examines this impact through the lens of the
medical treatment exception. 19 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
medical treatment statements' subject matter may include only "medi-
cal history"; "past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations"; and "the
inception or general character of [their] cause or external source."' 120
Further, such statements are admissible only if they reasonably pertain
to diagnosis or treatment.121 This exception comports with the Roberts
rationale for admitting hearsay: a patient knows lying to his doctor
may endanger his life or health, so his statements are likely to be
truthful. 122 But after Crawford and Davis, this inherent credibility no
longer suffices. 23
118. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
119. Courts do admit statements to health care providers under other hearsay
exceptions. See, e.g., Marshall v. State, 121 So. 72, 73-74 (Ala. 1929) (dying decla-
ration); State v. Johnson, 905 P.2d 1002, 1012-13 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (excited ut-
terance); People v. Tilley, 104 N.E.2d 499, 500 (Ill. 1952) (dying declaration);
Moore v. State, 338 A.2d 344, 346 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (excited utterance).
But the medical treatment exception lends itself to this Comment's overall inquiry
because, like the Davis test, it considers a statement's "purpose." See Davis, 126 S.
Ct. at 2273-74; FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
120. FED. R. EvID. 803(4).
121. Id.
122. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992) ("[A] statement made in
the course of procuring medical services, where the declarant knows that a false
statement may cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of
credibility that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.").
Under Roberts, hearsay statements were admissible so long as they bore "adequate
'indicia of reliability,"' and a statement that "[fell] within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception" satisfied this requirement. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). Dicta
in White v. Illinois explained the medical treatment exception was so rooted due to
its recognition in the Federal Rules of Evidence and wide acceptance among the
states. White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8. Hence, the Confrontation Clause did not bar ad-
mission of any statement within the scope of Rule 803(4).
123. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004) ("Dispensing with
confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury
21
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This Comment argues that under Davis, courts should treat health
care providers as agents of the police and their interactions with the
declarant as police interrogation in many circumstances. If so, unless
the declarant's medical condition constitutes an ongoing emergency,
his or her statements may be testimonial. The determination ultimately
turns on the interrogation's primary purpose, necessitating close fac-
tual inquiry.
This Part applies Davis to medical treatment statements in three
stages, focusing first on the threshold issue-whether an interaction
should be characterized as "police interrogation"-then on each of the
two elements in turn. Several post-Davis cases in which the Court ad-
dressed certiorari petitions inform this analysis. 124
A. Police Interrogation
Like Crawford, Davis deliberately declined to define "police in-
terrogation." 125 Crawford offered only that it used the term "in its col-
loquial, rather than any technical legal, sense" 126 but cited an earlier
case in which "interrogation" embraced "not only ... express ques-
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment
prescribes."); Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.
124. In some (the GVR cases), the Court issued orders granting certiorari, va-
cating the lower courts' decisions, and remanding for reconsideration in light of
Davis. See infra note 195. The Court has explained the purpose and rationale for
GVR orders as follows:
Where intervening developments, or recent developments that we have
reason to believe the court below did not fully consider, reveal a reason-
able probability that the decision below rests upon a premise that the lower
court would reject if given the opportunity for further consideration, and
where it appears that such a redetermination may determine the ultimate
outcome of the litigation, a GVR order is, we believe, potentially appro-
priate.
Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (emphasis added). Hence, the orders
indicate the Court believes Davis compels a different result in these cases. In others,
however, it merely denied certiorari without further explanation. See infra note 208.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes himself cautioned that "denial of a writ of certiorari
imports no expression of opinion on the merits of the case." United States v. Carver,
260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923). But these particular denials' context permits some tenta-
tive conclusions.
125. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.
126. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
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tioning, but also.., any words or actions on the part of the police...
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response."' 12 7 Yet Davis went further, treating a 911 operator as
a police agent and opening the door to characterizing other persons as
agents if they perform similar investigatory functions. 28 Since Craw-
ford, and even more so since Davis, commentators have speculated
that health care professionals might fall within this class. 1
29
This Comment contends the Court referred to agency, like inter-
rogation, in its colloquial sense. 130 For Confrontation Clause purposes,
courts should classify as police interrogators all persons who act on
behalf of or in place of law enforcement by intentionally investigating
crime and/or gathering evidence. This includes (1) medical experts
consulted to prepare for trial, (2) persons charged with a statutory duty
to report domestic and/or child abuse, (3) Sexual Assault Nurse Exam-
iners, and (4) persons connected with law enforcement, either through
police referral of the victim or knowing aid to police investigation.
127. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
128. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2.
129. See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and En-
suring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 511 (2005). Professor
Mosteller cites "private organizations that investigate suspected child abuse or sup-
port domestic violence victims" and-"when the government has substantial in-
volvement by requesting the information or through enforcement of reporting re-
quirements, interrogation systems, or physical presence"-other private parties. Id.
at 574. But he later suggests Crawford's failure to specifically address the medical
treatment statement at issue in White v. Illinois implies these may be non-
testimonial. Id. at 600. For post-Davis musings, see Mosteller, supra note 54, at 10
("Whether statements to doctors who have some treatment function will be virtually
automatically excluded when they clearly also have a prosecution function must be
answered."). For earlier comments, see, for example, Matthew M. Staab, Note,
Child's Play: Avoiding the Piqfalls of Crawford v. Washington in Child Abuse
Prosecution, 108 W. VA. L. REv. 501, 527 (2005) (stating that when "the medical
examination of [a] child occur[s] during the course of a police investigative proc-
ess," most children referred to the physician by police "would believe that state-
ments they made to a treating doctor would be used prosecutorially") and Ariana J.
Torchin, Note, A Multidimensional Framework for the Analysis of Testimonial
Hearsay under Crawford v. Washington, 94 GEO. L.J. 581, 615 (2006) (stating that
"an agency relationship between a medical doctor and law enforcement" could ren-
der a patient's statements testimonial).
130. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2002) (accepted legal defi-
nition of agency).
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1. Experts Consulted to Prepare for Trial
Under the medical treatment exception, statements made to a
health care provider whom the victim consults specifically to allow
the provider to testify at trial are admissible, even if the provider
works for the state or regularly with law enforcement.' 31 This sharp
divergence from conventional hearsay doctrine is anathema to Craw-
ford's reading of the Confrontation Clause. 132
Though Crawford's precise parameters were uncertain, the Court
indicated quite strongly that statements prepared in anticipation of
trial fell within the "core class of 'testimonial' statements."'' 33 Com-
mentators generally concurred that statements to medical experts con-
sulted merely for diagnosis-as distinguished from treatment-were
most problematic. For example, Professor Mosteller suggested that
"[s]tatements made after treatment [has] been completed, particularly
for a second opinion or a diagnosis-only purpose, should be carefully
screened under the Confrontation Clause."'1 34 Referring to multidisci-
plinary investigative teams, which blurred the line between diagnosis
and treatment, Professor Raeder observed that "Crawford appears to
undo" this investigative "best practice[]" involving cooperation
among "'social workers, physicians, therapists, prosecutors, judges,
131. FED. R. EvID. 803(4) advisory committee's note. "[T]he rule abolished the
distinction between the doctor who is consulted for the purpose of treatment and an
examination for the purpose of diagnosis only; the latter usually refers to a doctor
who is consulted only in order to testify as a witness." United States v. Iron Shell,
633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122,
1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding the trial court properly admitted victim's statements
to the psychologist who examined victim in anticipation of providing expert testi-
mony); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948, 950 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding vic-
tim's hearsay statements to her doctor, who was "consulted in order to testify as a
witness rather than for treatment," were admissible).
132. The Advisory Committee specifically endorsed the change, explaining it
as a nod to practical realities: "While these statements were not admissible as sub-
stantive evidence, the expert was allowed to state the basis of his opinion, including
statements of this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be
made by juries." FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
133. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
134. Mosteller, supra note 129, at 602 ("Unless ... the Confrontation Clause
can only be violated if the statement is received by a government agent, statements
in [this] category should now be excluded under Crawford.").
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and police officers."' 13 5 In these situations, when statements are pre-
pared with trial in mind, Crawford alone should bar their admission.
Yet some courts disagreed. For example, in In re T.T., an Illinois
court found statements to a pediatrician were not testimonial. 136 Act-
ing on a hotline tip, a Department of Children and Family Services in-
vestigator interviewed the child victim. 137 The court found "child pro-
tective services investigators [were not] a prosecutorial arm of the
State simply by virtue of their [investigatory] mandate."' 38 But be-
cause this investigator intended to assist the prosecution, she func-
tioned as its agent.' 39 She referred the victim to the physician based on
her account of sexual abuse, but the court held testimonial only the
child's statements to the physician identifying the defendant as the
perpetrator. 140 The doctor, who led her hospital's child abuse protec-
tion unit, "had previously testified as an expert witness in child abuse
cases."' 141 She examined the victim for diagnostic purposes "six
months after the alleged assault" on a referral from an agent of the
prosecution. 142 Her purpose-trial preparation-should have been
135. Raeder, supra note 108, at 381 (quoting OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE &
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE
TO CHILD ABUSE 3 (reprint 2001) (1997)); see also Mosteller, supra note 129, at 602
("If testimonial statements are broadly defined,... statements received by doctors
who are part of investigative teams after the case has been identified as suspect
should be considered testimonial .... "). But see Phillips, supra note 12, at 21 (con-
cluding that a victim's statements to a health care provider "who is primarily or ex-
clusively working with a governmental [multidisciplinary team]" are likely testimo-
nial only where the "provider does not engage in diagnosis or treatment of the
victim").
136. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 794, 803 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004), followed by In
re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183, 188 (El. App. Ct. 2004) (finding that statements ob-
tained by a child advocacy center worker who interviewed a victim while an officer
watched through a two-way mirror were testimonial).
137. In re TT., 815 N.E.2dat 793.
138. Id. at 801. State law required the investigator to refer reports of "alleged
child sexual abuse to the police and State's Attorney for consideration of a criminal
investigation" and authorized her to assist with these efforts. Id.
139. Id. at 801; see also State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349, 352 (Or. 2004) (finding
that a victim's statements to a Department of Human Services caseworker were tes-
timonial because she "was serving as a proxy for the police").
140. In re T.T., 815 N.E.2dat 803.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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clear, but the court refused to hold she had "constructively acted as the
government's agent in interrogating [the victim]." 14 3
Under Davis, such persons are unquestionably police agents.
When an expert interviews a victim to prepare reports or testimony for
trial, he is no less an agent of the prosecution than the officer who in-
terviews the victim at the crime scene. When he repeats the victim's
words at trial, the victim testifies through him. 144 If testimonial evi-
dence can be admitted through this "middleman" mechanism, then the
Confrontation Clause's renewed vigor post-Crawford is a sham. By
characterizing experts consulted for trial preparation as police agents,
and subjecting their interactions with victims to Davis's test, courts
can ensure a defendant's right to confront those who bear witness
against him is not circumvented so easily.
2. Mandatory Reporters
In her 2005 exploration of Crawford's impact on domestic vio-
lence and child abuse prosecutions, Professor Myrna Raeder specu-
lated that "[t]o the extent that the doctor has a reporting duty in do-
mestic violence cases, the argument can be made that the statements
are testimonial ... because the doctor is an agent of the police .... 145
Under Davis, this argument gains strength.
143. Id.; see also People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920, 923-24, 926 (Colo. 2006)
(finding that an interview of a victim by a doctor, who "was a member of a child
protection team" and who spoke to the police prior to examining the victim, was not
"functionally equivalent to formal police interrogation... absent a more direct and
controlling police presence" because he testified he questioned the victim to ascer-
tain his injuries).
144. See, e.g., State v. Pitt, 147 P.3d 940, 945 (Or. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that
children's statements to a Child Advocacy Center worker during an interview ar-
ranged and videotaped by police to prepare for trial were testimonial).
145. Raeder, supra note 108, at 350. "[W]hen the physician is not part of a
prosecutorial forensic team or otherwise motivated to obtain an accusatory state-
ment," Professor Raeder believes "the nature of the statement," rather than the exis-
tence of a reporting statute, should determine whether that statement is testimonial.
Id. at 379; cf Phillips, supra note 12, at 26 (suggesting that a health care provider's
duty to report child abuse should render a victim's identification of the abuser non-
testimonial because Child Protective Services will need this information in order to
act appropriately on the report).
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Thirty-five states and the District of Columbia require reports by
medical practitioners who treat specified injuries. 146 Although few
states' statutes specifically target domestic violence or abuse, many
mandate reporting for intentionally inflicted injuries or injuries result-
ing from criminal activity, both of which may apply in domestic vio-
lence cases. 147 Reports are typically made to local law enforcement.
148
As an example, California's statute applies to any public or private
"health practitioner . . . who, in his or her professional capacity or
within the scope of his or her employment, provides medical services
for a physical condition to a patient whom he or she knows or rea-
sonably suspects" suffers from injuries inflicted by spouse or cohabi-
tant abuse. 149 Failure to comply with the statutory mandate is a mis-
demeanor punishable by up to six months' imprisonment and/or a
$1,000 fine.15 °
Similarly, all fifty states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted statutes mandating reports of child maltreatment. 5' Nearly
twenty jurisdictions "require all citizens to report suspected abuse or
neglect," but most impose the duty only on certain persons. 15 2 Health
care providers are almost always covered, and many states deny the
physician-patient privilege in this context.' 53 The duty to report typi-
cally arises when the reporter "in his or her official capacity, suspects
or has reasons to believe that a child has been abused or neglected."'
154
Though most states permit anonymous reporting, approximately
twenty jurisdictions "require mandatory reporters to provide their
146. See NAT'L HEALTH RES. CTR. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MANDATORY
REPORTING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS app. IX (2004),
available at http://www.endabuse.org/health/mandatoryreporting/tables1.pdf.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007);
COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-135 (2006).
149. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
150. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
151. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws-policies/statutes/manda.pdf.
152. Id. at 1-2, 3 (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 2-3.
154. Id. at 3.
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names and contact information." '1 55 Typically, states designate child
protective services agencies to receive and investigate reports, but
some also direct reports to law enforcement. 156 States enforce these
duties through penalties variable in their severity; though Massachu-
setts, for example, prescribes a fine of up to $1000,157 in California,
failure to report is a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months'
imprisonment and/or a $1000 fine. 158
These statutes, for both domestic violence and child abuse, effec-
tively deputize all medical practitioners. A legal agency would require
designated reporters' assent, 159 but such formalism is unnecessary to
create police interrogation in a merely "colloquial" sense. Concededly,
reporting statutes' notional purposes are salutary and prophylactic as
well as punitive-mandatory child abuse reporting seeks to protect
vulnerable children from further harm. 160 This is certainly relevant to
Davis's third element, the primary purpose determination. But where
reports must be made to law enforcement, the legislature has con-
scripted reporters to aid police. 161 Indeed, failure to perform this duty
155. Id. at 4.
156. Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Child Abuse Reporting Numbers, http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/reslist
/rl-dsp.cfm?rsid=5&rate chno=1 1-11172 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
157. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 51A (West 2003 & Supp. 2006).
158. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166(c) (West Supp. 2007).
159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
160. See Child Welfare Info. Gateway, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
Responding to Child Abuse & Neglect, Overview, http://www.childwelfare.gov
/responding/overview.cfm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) ("Responding to child abuse
and neglect involves protecting children from harm and supporting families to re-
duce the risk of future harm to children.").
161. See State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). The court's
observations on Minnesota's child abuse reporting statute make this distinction:
Under the analysis presented in Davis, the statutory policy for a mandatory
"investigation" of child-abuse reports takes on added importance .... [I]n
light of the analysis in Davis, the non-criminal purpose inherent in child-
abuse reporting is not significant to the Confrontation Clause analysis
when the child's health and welfare are no longer at risk and the nature of
the interview is an "investigation into possibly criminal past conduct," an
investigation into past events-and the overriding purpose under Davis,
for Confrontation Clause purposes, is to obtain evidence for a criminal
prosecution.
Id. at 922 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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carries a penalty-in some states, a criminal one. Hence, when a des-
ignated reporter questions a patient concerning injuries he suspects
must be reported, he acts as a police agent, in fulfillment of his statu-
tory duty.162 Any rational mandatory reporter aware of his legal obli-
gation must be presumed to act with knowledge of its potential conse-
quences, and this knowledge transforms his inquiries of a domestic or
child abuse victim into police interrogation under Davis.
3. Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners
Like mandatory reporters, Sexual Assault Nurse Examiners
(SANEs) should categorically be treated as police agents. "A SANE is
a registered nurse who has advanced educational and clinical prepara-
tion in forensic examination of sexual assault victims."' 63 The U.S.
Department of Justice provides guidance to states and localities on
implementing SANE programs.'1 64 One national registry lists well over
300 programs in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. 65 Identi-
fied benefits of such programs include "more effective investigations
and better prosecutions" because during their examinations SANEs
collect forensic evidence for police. 16 6 "SANEs release evidence to
law enforcement agencies only with the victim's consent in cases
where the victim has agreed to report or has already reported the
crime," but release is mandatory in many circumstances.1 67 Their in-
162. But cf. State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097, 1108 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006)
("[S]tatutory imperative [to collect sexual assault evidence with the victim's con-
sent] alone does not transform medical professionals from physicians to prosecu-
tors."); Phillips, supra note 12, at 19-20, 21 (noting that under Crawford, victims'
statements to SANEs may be deemed testimonial, but arguing that this outcome is
only appropriate where the SANE "does not diagnose and/or provide treatment to a
patient and is primarily duty-bound to collect evidence for law enforcement").
163. KRISTIN LITTEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES,
SEXUAL ASSAULT NURSE EXAMINER (SANE) PROGRAMS: IMPROVING THE
COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS 1 (2001), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/sane_4_2001/186366.pdf.
164. Id. at 1-2.
165. See Sexual Assault Resource Service Sexual Assault Response Team,
http://www.sane-sart.com/staticpages/index.php?page=20031023141144274 (last
visited Mar. 29, 2007).
166. LITTEL, supra note 163, at 1.
167. Id. at 4.
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volvement in the criminal process does not end there. "They view tes-
tifying as an integral part of their job" and often "communicate with
prosecutors" beforehand. 168 Hence, though they also perform some
clinical functions, SANEs, by training and in practice, are evidence
gatherers and expert witnesses.
Some courts recognized the significance of these latter roles even
before Davis.16 9 Yet others stubbornly refused to acknowledge
SANEs' law enforcement function.'
7 0
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006), cert. denied, 75
U.S.L.W. 3437 (2007). Where a SANE interviewed a rape victim the day after her
assault, the Nevada Supreme Court held the victim's statements were testimonial. Id.
at 473-74, 476. Recognizing that SANEs are specially trained "to gather evidence
for possible criminal prosecution in cases of alleged sexual assault," the court rea-
soned the circumstances of the interview "would lead an objective witness to rea-
sonably believe [the victim's statements] would be available for use at a later trial."
Id. at 473, 476.
170. See, e.g., State v. Stahl, No. 22261, 2005 WL 602687 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
16, 2005), affd, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006). Finding a rape victim's statements to
a SANE non-testimonial, an Ohio appellate court cited "two common sense bases."
Id. at *5. First, having already given a statement to the police, the victim could rea-
sonably have viewed the nurse's role as a strictly salutary one-she could have de-
scribed the assault due to her trust in the nurse without expecting it might be used
for prosecution. Id. at *6-7. Second, the court found the victim could reasonably
have believed the SANE's interview was "for the purpose of providing physical evi-
dence, without necessarily understanding that she was also providing testimonial
evidence." Id. at *6. Recently, and despite the benefit of the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion in Davis, the Ohio Supreme Court compounded this error. State v. Stahl,
855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006). It distinguished Davis and Hammon because Stahl's
victim's statements were "made to a medical professional at a medical facility," and
settling on an "objective witness test" rather than an interrogator-focused inquiry, it
determined the primary purpose of the SANE's interrogation was to administer
"proper medical treatment." Id. at 841, 844. It rejected Stahl's contention that the
victim should reasonably have expected her statements might be used to prosecute
him because she signed a form consenting to the release of evidence to police. Id. at
845-46. Because the form described types of physical evidence that would be re-
leased, without expressly mentioning statements, the court held a reasonable person
would believe the questioning "serve[d] a primarily health-care-related function."
Id. at 846. As translated by Professor Friedman, "The bad guy is going to get off
here unless this statement is characterized as non-testimonial, so it will be." Richard
D. Friedman, Manipulation of the "Objective Witness" Standard, The Confrontation
Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2006 11_01_archive.html (Nov. 10,
2006, 13:17 EST).
[Vol. 43480
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Under Davis, however, SANEs are indisputably police agents, as
one Idaho court recognized in State v. Hooper. 171 Hooper was tried for
molesting his six-year-old daughter after she admitted the abuse to her
mother, who contacted police. 172 An officer responded, and after an
initial investigation, he "arranged for [the girl] and her mother to go to
a Sexual Trauma Abuse Response (STAR) Center for an examination
and further interview."1 73 The trial court admitted a videotape of the
interview because the girl was too frightened to testify. 174 The appel-
late court held the SANE was acting as an agent of the police-she
was a self-described "'forensic interviewer,"' and police sent the vic-
tim to the center and supervised her visit.1 75 The SANE testified the
interview's purpose was to prepare for trial, and nothing indicated it
"had a diagnostic, therapeutic or medical purpose."'' 76 Applying
Davis, the court noted the interview's nonemergency timing-"several
hours after the alleged criminal event"-and its focus on establishing
past events.1 77 The court concluded the victim's statement "was pre-
cisely the kind of statement that a witness would give on direct ex-
amination at trial."'' 78
Notably, the SANE in Hooper was also an expert consulted to
prepare for trial-this, alone, would render her a police agent-but her
forensic training influenced the Idaho court's decision. Even in a hos-
pital, before police are directly involved, when a SANE employs that
forensic training to question a victim and gather physical evidence,
she acts as an agent of police.
171. State v. Hooper, No. 31025, 2006 WL 2328233, at *4 (Idaho Ct. App.
Aug. 11, 2006); cf State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006) (finding, in analo-
gous factual circumstances, Child Advocacy Center forensic interviewer was an
agent of police because her "purpose was undoubtedly to prepare for trial").
172. Hooper, 2006 WL 2328233, at *1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *4. Further, "[t]oward the end of the interview, the nurse inquired of
the officer whether all the questions that the officer desired had been asked, and then
returned to the interview room with several additional queries, apparently at the of-
ficer's instruction." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at *3.
178. Id.
31
Stevens: Deputy-Doctors: The Medical Treatment Exception After Davis v. Wa
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2006
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
4. Other State-Connected Persons
Davis may extend even further to nominally private actors with
some connection to law enforcement. This embraces health care pro-
viders who treat the declarant on police referral or who are aware the
declarant is involved in a police investigation. 179 As in the Davis test's
second prong, purpose is key, but this Comment suggests investiga-
tory or evidence-gathering purpose, whether "primary" or otherwise,
should determine police agency.
a. Referrals
When a health care professional interviews a victim whom police
have referred, he should often be considered a police agent. The pro-
vider knows the victim has consulted him at the behest of police en-
gaged in an ongoing criminal investigation. Even if the consultation
does not occur explicitly for trial preparation, the Davis test should
apply when the provider seeks to repeat the victim's statements to him
at a later trial. In State v. Krasky, a Minnesota appellate court
agreed.180 There, a nurse practitioner at a Children's Resource Center
interviewed a child sexual abuse victim after the investigating police
officer "'decided that [it was] the best way to proceed with the inves-
tigation. '"" '' A child-protection worker involved in the investigation
observed the interview, and the police officer viewed a videotape of
the interview before completing his report.182 Emphasizing that the of-
179. At least one commentator has suggested Crawford and Davis have little
impact on statements to private parties. See Meier, supra note 59, at 25 (asserting
that statements to private parties, "which often provide critical evidence in adult and
child abuse cases.... remain relatively unconstrained by Crawford and Davis"); cf
Mosteller, supra note 54, at 7 (noting that whether the Confrontation Clause "will
extend to problematic hearsay in ... child sexual abuse cases is quite possible, but
undetermined"). Relying on "omissions from the Supreme Court's two most recent
Confrontation Clause opinions," Professor Mosteller speculates that Justice Scalia's
failure to reference Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), may indicate that it sur-
vives Crawford and Davis. Id. at 10. Though "the statement in Wright[] . .. had
strong investigative features .... it might be excluded [under Davis] because it was
not a statement to a government officer and certainly not to a police officer where
falsehoods are criminal." Id.
180. State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
181. Id. at 923 (quoting the police report).
182. Id.
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ficer arranged the interview, the court found the nurse had acted "in
concert with police."' 183 Hence, medical professionals who interview
victims referred by police should often be classified as police agents
under Davis.
b. Knowing Assistants
When medical personnel knowingly aid a criminal investigation,
they act as police agents. Knowing assistance may take many forms,
but two are of particular concern. First, a health care professional who
questions a patient delivered to the hospital by police, with police pre-
sent, must reasonably know that a crime is suspected and that his dia-
logue with the victim will be used to investigate it. The provider's
primary purpose may be to diagnose, but his questions may also un-
earth evidence critical to the listening officer's investigation. In these
circumstances, the doctor functions as a "strawman."'' 84 If the officer
were to ask the questions himself, this would constitute police interro-
gation. Mere insertion of a third party questioner-when the ques-
tioner and victim know the officer is present-should not alter this re-
sult.
Second, a medical provider who collects and preserves forensic
evidence when he examines and interviews a purported crime victim
also acts as a police agent. That evidence is provided to police only
with the victim's consent is irrelevant: the provider gathers evidence
for a possible criminal investigation. Since Davis, a Connecticut court
has declined to apply this analysis.' 8 5 In State v. Slater, the court re-
fused to characterize an emergency room doctor and nurse as police
agents and found a sexual assault victim's statements to them non-
testimonial. 186 Because questioning occurred "'for a diagnostic pur-
pose"' and "'was the byproduct of substantive medical activity,"' it
was held to be non-testimonial. 187 The court observed that the victim
183. Id.
184. Black's Law Dictionary defines a strawman as "[a] third party used in
some transactions as a temporary transferee to allow the principal parties to accom-
plish something that is otherwise impermissible." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1461
(8th ed. 2004).
185. State v. Slater, 908 A.2d 1097 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
186. Id. at 1108.
187. Id. at 1106 (quoting State v. Kirby, 908 A.2d 506, 527 (Conn. 2006)).
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made no effort to identify her attacker, the doctor and nurse did not
consult police before interviewing the victim, and the police were not
present in the emergency room.1 88 But it casually dismissed one addi-
tional, glaring fact: the doctor and nurse prepared a rape kit "that later
would be used in a criminal prosecution."' 89 Indeed, a rape kit has no
other significant purpose. 190 The court should have deemed the doctor
and nurse police agents because they knowingly gathered evidence.'1 91
Though this result may seem extreme, it must be considered in
context. Once a health care professional's questions are characterized
as police interrogation, two additional elements must be satisfied to
render a victim's responses testimonial. 192
B. Ongoing Emergency
Where a declarant makes a statement "for purposes of medical di-
agnosis or treatment," the medical condition he or she describes could
satisfy the Davis test's ongoing emergency element. But what defines
an ongoing medical emergency? Courts confronting this issue could
rely on established medical authorities or expert testimony in making
evidentiary rulings. But even if medical science can readily define the
term "ongoing emergency," it must still comport with the Court's
post-Davis GVR 193 orders. In a memorandum to Professor Friedman's
Crawford-inspired blog that analyzed these cases, 194 the District of
Columbia's Public Defender Service (PDS) offered two observations
related to Davis's "ongoing emergency" prong.
First, the PDS believes that to qualify as "an emergency-resolving
nontestimonial statement to law enforcement officers" under Davis,
the emergency must be "ongoing and actual, not past, future, or theo-
188. Id. at 1107-08.
189. Id. at 1108.
190. See generally Linda M. Petter & David L. Whitehill, Management of Fe-
male Sexual Assault, 58 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 920 (1998).
191. But see Phillips, supra note 12, at 20-21 (asserting that health care provid-
ers who "are required to collect evidence and statements from victims as part of a
law enforcement investigation" should only be treated as police agents if their ques-
tions and actions serve no diagnosis or treatment purpose).
192. See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
193. See supra note 124.
194. See Friedman, supra note 170.
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retical."' 195 An ongoing medical emergency must then be one that
presently threatens the victim's life or long-term health, such as gush-
ing blood or a broken bone. Regardless of lingering emotional trauma,
more superficial injuries might not qualify.
The lower courts' opinions in the GVR cases largely support the
PDS's analysis, but not entirely. The PDS asserts that a credible threat
of future danger is not an ongoing emergency based on two cases,
State v. Warsame and State v. Wright.196 But this reliance is mis-
placed. First, in Warsame, the defendant remained at large while the
declarant, a domestic violence victim, spoke to a police officer; the
lower court held that her initial statements were non-testimonial. 197
The PDS assumes Warsame posed a continuing threat to the victim. 98
But though Warsame was not in police custody, the officer-victim dia-
logue occurred face-to-face in a public street.1 99 Like Amy
Hammon,2 ° ° the declarant spoke while in the protective presence of a
(likely armed) police officer, indicating that all danger to her had sub-
sided.2 °'
195. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2 (citing Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350
(Alaska Ct. App. 2005), cert. granted, vacated, remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006);
People v. Thomas, 2005 WL 2093065 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2005), cert. granted,
vacated, remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802
(Minn. 2005), cert. granted, vacated, remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006); State v.
Warsame, 701 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), cert. granted, vacated, re-
manded, 126. S. Ct. 2983 (2006); State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d 830 (N.C. 2005), cert.
granted, vacated, remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); State v. Forrest, 596 S.E.2d 22
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004), aff'd, 611 S.E.2d 833 (N.C. 2005), cert. granted, vacated, re-
manded, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006)).
196. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2.
197. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d at 307; cf State v. Warsame, 723 N.W.2d 637,
241-42 (Minn. 2006) (concluding on remand, again, that statements were non-
testimonial because "[a]s long as a possible emergency situation, occurring at an-
other location or involving another person, is related to the complainant's own situa-
tion and is one which can be clarified by questioning her, the purpose of the ques-
tioning may be considered as for the primary purpose of enabling police assistance
to meet an ongoing emergency, making the complainant's statements non-
testimonial").
198. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 2.
199. Warsame, 701 N.W.2d at 307.
200. See supra text accompanying note 96.
201. Id.
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Second, Wright involved two hearsay statements, either of which
could conceivably have led the Court to remand.2 °2 Admission of a
911 call the victim made after Wright had left the premises was not
necessarily improper. In Davis, the Court implied that the ongoing
emergency may have ended when Davis fled 203-though Davis, like
Wright, remained at large. If the call in Davis became testimonial
thereafter, the call in Wright was likely testimonial from its beginning.
But the two cases are distinguishable. Whereas Wright departed be-
fore his victim summoned the police, carrying keys to the apartment
and a firearm,20 4 Davis probably fled because he feared arrest, and
nothing indicates he had a gun. 20 5 Wright was therefore more likely to
return before police arrived and could inflict far greater harm if he did.
The future danger he posed to his victim was neither abstract nor hy-
pothetical and may have warranted the label "ongoing emergency."
20 6
This approach would define medical emergencies more broadly so
as to include some future threats as ongoing emergencies. Specifi-
cally, some conditions posing no immediate threat to the victim-such
as internal bleeding, infection, or blood clots-could rapidly develop
into life-threatening emergencies if left untreated. This category of
concrete future threats could qualify as "ongoing emergencies" under
Davis.
The PDS's second observation concludes that only statements
"that provide information critical to resolving the particular emer-
gency presented" will qualify as non-testimonial:
Anderson and Lewis can both be read as cases where the uncon-
fronted statements were clearly testimonial because the defendant
had left the scene, the crime was over, and there was no ongoing
emergency situation. [Even] if the emergency is redefined as the
complainants' need for medical attention, these cases can be read as
decisions in which the complainants' statements to police discuss-
202. State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2005); see also Memoran-
dum, supra note 60, at 2.
203. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006).
204. Wright, 701 N.W.2d at 804.
205. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2271.
206. See also United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 2006)
(finding that an anonymous 911 caller's statements describing a shooting that had
just occurred and the whereabouts of gunman were non-testimonial).
486 [Vol. 43
36
California Western Law Review, Vol. 43 [2006], No. 2, Art. 7
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol43/iss2/7
2007] MEDICAL TREATMENT EXCEPTION AFTER DAVIS V. WASH. 487
ing the crime and identifying their assailants-unlike in Davis
where the ongoing emergency was the assailant's continued pres-
ence at the scene-had no bearing on the resolution of that particu-
lar emergency. 2
0 7
The PDS finds further support among the certiorari denial cases in
which lower courts deemed statements non-testimonial when "directly
related to the resolution of [an ongoing] emergency." 208 Both State v.
Hembertt and State v. Greene, for instance, strongly imply that state-
ments directed to securing a crime scene are non-testimonial under
Davis.
20 9
207. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 3. In Anderson, an officer responding to a
911 call and report of injuries found a man lying on a hotel room floor beneath a
blanket, his torso bruised and his breathing impaired. Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d
350, 351 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). When the officer asked what had happened, the
victim claimed Anderson had hit him with a pipe. Id. In Lewis, an officer arrived at a
robbery victim's apartment within hours of the crime. State v. Lewis, 619 S.E.2d
830, 832 (N.C. 2005). Because "[the victim's] face and arms [were] badly bruised
and swollen[,] . . . [the officer] spoke with [her] to determine whether she needed
assistance and to find out what happened." Id. In response, she described the rob-
bery, which had occurred in the hallway outside the apartment, and her assailant,
whom she linked to a resident down the hall. Id. Although each declarant in these
cases required medical attention, in neither case were the challenged statements di-
rectly related to this need.
208. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 5 (referencing United States v. Brito, 427
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2983 (2006); State v. Greene, 874
A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2981(2006); State v. Hembertt, 696
N.W.2d 473 (Neb. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2977 (2006); State v. Quintero,
No. M2003-0231 1-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 941004 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 22,
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2979 (2006)); see Commonwealth v. Foley, 833
N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006); Commonwealth v.
Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549 (Mass. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2980 (2006); cf
Memorandum, supra note 60, at 4 (observing that in Foley and Gonsalves, both do-
mestic violence cases, the "lower courts appear[ed] to have properly anticipated the
rule of Davis and categorized statements to police as nontestimonial and testimonial
based on the existence of an ongoing emergency").
209. Greene, 874 A.2d at 775; Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d at 483. Hembertt in-
volved spontaneous statements made by a domestic violence victim while the assail-
ant remained on the premises armed with a knife. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d at 477. The
Nebraska Supreme Court reasoned "the area and suspect were unsecured," and the
victim's statements "were made to assist in securing the scene." Id. at 483. Simi-
larly, in Greene, a bystander superficially wounded during a gang-related shooting
approached responding police immediately "to report a possible injury," and the of-
ficer to whom he spoke "ask[ed] questions to ensure that the victim receive[d]
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Courts holding that a declarant's need for medical attention con-
stituted an emergency must carefully parse that declarant's statements
to determine whether his or her description of how that need arose was
"critical to resolving the particular emergency presented. ' 210 For ex-
ample, when asked about the source of her wounds, a bleeding domes-
tic violence victim might explain that her husband had slashed her
with a kitchen knife "again." The origin of the abrasions-a kitchen
knife, probably not terribly sharp and possibly covered in bacteria-
would reasonably be relevant to a physician's approach to treatment.
But neither the identification element (that her husband was the perpe-
trator) nor the medical history element (that this had happened before)
would be critical to treating her current wounds. The medical treat-
ment exception encompasses medical history, but unless this informa-
tion is truly critical to resolving the ongoing emergency, courts must
consider it testimonial.
C. Primary Purpose
One could certainly argue that the medical treatment exception,
which applies only to statements whose purpose is medical diagnosis
or treatment, is by definition non-testimonial. But the Court has re-
jected this position as to excited utterances; a declarant's excited state
of mind does not preclude prosecutorial purpose.21' Similar logic
should apply when a statement is, by definition, "for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment." This may be a purpose of the state-
ment but not necessarily its primary purpose, so Davis's purpose in-
quiry still applies.
proper medical attention and that the crime scene [was] properly secured." Greene,
874 A.2d at 775. The Connecticut Supreme Court deemed his statements non-
testimonial. Id.
210. Memorandum, supra note 60, at 3.
211. In Hammon, the trial court originally admitted Amy Hammon's testimo-
nial statements as excited utterances. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 447 (Ind.
2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 552 (2005); see also Davis v. Washington, 126 S.
Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006); People v. Castellanos, Nos. B175888, B181286, 2005 WL
1763623 (Cal. App. July 27, 2005), cert. granted, vacated, remanded, 126 S. Ct.
2965 (2006). In Castellanos, after a police car chase and while the defendant fled on
foot, his passenger-dazed, crying, and still in the car-asked an approaching offi-
cer what had happened. Id. at *2. When the officer explained that the car was stolen,
she stated that Castellanos had "tried to hit one of the officers" with the car. Id.
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But whose purpose matters? In State v. Snowden, a pre-Davis de-
cision that relied heavily on the purpose of a social worker's inter-
views that produced the challenged statements, the Maryland Court of
Appeals considered both the interviewer's and the declarants' perspec-
tives:212
[The declarants'] awareness of the prosecutorial purpose of the in-
terviews not only satisfies any objective formulation of what is
"testimonial," but, in our opinion, demonstrates that the children
actually were aware that their statements had the potential to be
used against Snowden in an effort to hold him accountable for his
conduct.... Even if we were inclined to ignore the children's ac-
tual awareness of the purpose of the interviews, . . . [it is] undeni-
able ... that the express purpose of bringing the children to the fa-
cility to be interviewed was to develop their testimony for possible
use at trial.2 13
The court deemed the interviews' therapeutic element "secondary, in
terms of proper Confrontation Clause analysis, to the overarching...
testimonial nature[] of the [children's] statements. 214
Where, as in Snowden, the declarants' and interrogator's purposes
coincide, the primary purpose inquiry is a simple one. But Davis does
not establish for certain whose purpose matters,215 and in the medical
treatment context, the answer may well be outcome determinative.
1. Declarant-Focused Inquiry
If, as Davis assures us, "it is in the final analysis the declarant's
statements, not the interrogator's questions, that the Confrontation
Clause requires us to evaluate,"2 16 then courts must assess medical
treatment statements' primary purpose from a reasonable declarant's
perspective. If one ignores or minimizes individual circumstances, the
212. State v. Snowden, 867 A.2d 314, 326-27 (2005) (supporting the trial
court's finding that "interviews were made for the express purpose of satisfying the
requirements of' a statutory hearsay exception analogous to that for medical treat-
ment statements).
213. Id. at 326.
214. Id. at 330.
215. See supra Part III.A.
216. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1.
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result is simple. As one commentator observed: "[P]atients do not
wish to establish or prove any facts. Patients answer questions and
provide information for the sole purpose of facilitating their medical
care."
217
But patients are human beings with mixed motives. Though it
nominally rested its holding on other facts, one pre-Davis case recog-
nized this inescapable truth. There, a SANE nurse's interview with a
sexual assault victim occurred three weeks after the assault, and be-
cause the victim's statements did not focus on the attack itself, the
court reasoned her purpose was not merely to obtain medical treat-
ment. " 8 In most cases, however, a declarant-focused inquiry will con-
clude that the statements' primary purpose is to secure medical aid,
not to "prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecu-
tion. 2 1
9
Historical treatment of child abuse victims' statements to medical
personnel indicates this outcome is particularly likely in child abuse
cases. In the current version of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
medical treatment exception "extends to statements as to causation,
reasonably pertinent to" medical treatment or diagnosis, but ordinarily
not to "[s]tatements as to fault., 220 In United States v. Renville, the
Eighth Circuit established the principal exception to this restriction.22
1
Because child abuse involves not only physical injuries but also psy-
chological ones whose nature and gravity depend heavily on the
abuser's identity, this information may determine whether the course
of treatment should include removal from the child's present living
conditions.222 Hence, "[s]tatements by a child abuse victim to a physi-
cian during an examination that the abuser is a member of the victim's
217. Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the
"Testimonial Statements" Test in Crawford v. Washington, 11 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 387, 400 (2005).
218. State v. Romero, 133 P.3d 842, 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). The court held
that her statements during the interview were testimonial. Id. at 858.
219. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274.
220. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note; see also United States v.
Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980) (observing that when a declarant's "state-
ments concern[ed] what happened rather than who assaulted her, .. . the latter would
seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related [to diagnosis or treatment]").
221. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
222. Id. at 437-38.
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immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment" and thus
admissible under the medical treatment exception.223 Courts nation-
wide have adopted Renville's rationale.224
Many commentators surmised that Crawford would eliminate this
practice.225 One Illinois court recognized the shift, differentiating be-
tween a child sexual abuse victim's statements to a doctor "regarding
the nature of the alleged attack, the physical exam, and complaints of
pain or injury" and her "accusatory statements identifying ... the per-
petrator., 226 Yet other courts read Crawford in a manner that effec-
tively created a new exception: if a reasonable child in the victim's
position might not expect his statements to be later used at trial, they
would not be testimonial.227 This reasoning could justify finding even
223. Id. at 436-37.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1450 (10th Cir. 1995)
(finding it "clear" that information contained in a child abuse victim's statement to a
physician, including the abuser's identity, was "important to [the physician's] de-
termination of [the victim's] condition"); United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 757
(7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he task of the physician treating the victim of such an attack re-
quires attention not only to the physical manifestations of trauma but to the psycho-
logical ones as well.").
225. See, e.g., Ralph Ruebner & Timothy Scahill, Crawford v. Washington, the
Confrontation Clause, and Hearsay: A New Paradigm for Illinois Evidence Law, 36
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 703, 762 (2005) ("There are clearly some statements made to
medical personnel . . . that should rightly be deemed testimonial, such as an out-of-
court statement of the victim identifying her abuser."). For an intriguing proposal
relating specifically to child victims, see Staab, supra note 129, at 520-22 (arguing
that where a child declarant is unavailable because the trial court has found him in-
competent to testify, the child's hearsay statements are necessarily non-testimonial
because an incompetent person would be incapable of reasonably expecting that his
statements might later be used at trial).
226. People v. T.T. (In re. T.T.), 815 N.E. 2d 789, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Contra State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Neb. 2004) (holding that the victim's
identification statement was admissible because her physician claimed it was neces-
sary to ensure the child's mental and emotional health and that the child was not re-
leased into the perpetrator's care).
227. See, e.g., Miller v. Fleming, No. C04-1289P, 2006 WL 435466, at *7-8
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2006) (holding that a child's statements to an emergency
room doctor and nurse were not testimonial because no police were present during
the examinations, and "an objective seven-year old would not believe that her state-
ments to medical professionals would be available for use at a later trial"); People v.
Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 (Colo. 2006) (holding that a child sexual assault victim's
statements were not testimonial because "an objectively reasonable seven-year-old
child would expect that a doctor would use his statements to make him feel better
41
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child victims' accusatory statements non-testimonial. A reasonable
child might understand, in abstract, that the accused would "get in
trouble," but police involvement and trial would be ideas too complex
to grasp.
If courts must evaluate primary purpose from the declarant's per-
spective, they should not apply this child standard. To do so would
condition testimonial statements' admission on the declarant's level of
sophistication and risk police manipulation.228 In the medical treat-
ment context, a reasonable declarant standard would align with Craw-
ford's vision of the Confrontation Clause 229 and would typically pro-
duce victim-friendly results. From the patient's point of view, when
consulting a medical professional, his primary purpose must almost
always be to secure medical aid, not to "prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution. "230
2. Interrogator-Focused Inquiry
But if, as the Davis Court's language suggests and some commen-
tators contend, the inquiry targets the interrogator, then primary pur-
pose becomes far more difficult to discern. Justice Thomas identified
this dilemma in his Davis dissent, observing that police officers inter-
view crime victims "both to respond to the emergency situation and to
gather evidence."23 The medical treatment exception requires that a
statement's purpose be medical treatment or diagnosis, but this need
and to formulate a medical diagnosis... [but] would not foresee the statements be-
ing used in a later trial"); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849 N.E.2d 218, 226
(Mass. 2006) (concluding that a child victim's statements were non-testimonial be-
cause there was no evidence that she "even recognized the criminality of the defen-
dant's sexual contacts with her," and "a reasonable person in [her] position, and
armed with her knowledge, could not have anticipated that her statements might be
used in a prosecution").
228. Cf Lininger, supra note 60, at 30 (suggesting that the new focus on an in-
terrogator's purpose will deter police from "contriv[ing] circumstances in which a
plain-clothes interlocutor speaks with a child for investigative purposes[] while the
child . . . may not believe that he or she is providing information for prosecutorial
use").
229. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004) (discussing an
objective/reasonable witness standard).
230. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006).
231. Id. at 2283 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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not be its sole or even primary purpose. Further, the hearsay exception
focuses on the declarant-if, in a police interrogation, the interroga-
tor's purpose determines whether responses to his or her questions are
testimonial, then medical treatment statements could easily qualify.
Where the interrogator is an expert consulted to prepare for trial-a
mandatory reporter, a SANE, or a health care provider otherwise con-
nected with law enforcement-one purpose of questioning may be
clinical, but other motives may also intrude.
One pre-Davis commentator concluded that when medical per-
sonnel conduct forensic interviews of child abuse victims, "[m]ixed
motives, such as arranging for services or protection for the child, do
not render these testimonial statements non-testimonial., 232 But courts
applying Craiwford anticipated Davis's focus on primary purpose. In
holding non-testimonial a child sexual abuse victim's statements to a
hospital child protection team member, despite substantial police in-
volvement, the Colorado Supreme Court emphasized the doctor's
principal purpose was to ascertain the child's physical condition.233
Indeed, this focus on the interrogating health care provider's pri-
mary purpose will likely save medical treatment statements from ex-
clusion in many cases. But because surrounding circumstances,
viewed objectively, determine this purpose, courts must engage in
close factual evaluation. 4 Even where the provider asks inarguably
232. Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-Vamps
Two Decades of Confrontation Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50
S.D. L. REv. 41, 70 (2005).
233. People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 922-26 (Colo. 2006); see also State v. Bo-
badilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 254-55 (Minn. 2006) (holding that a child sexual abuse
victim's statements to a child-protection worker were not testimonial because the
interview's primary purpose was to ascertain whether the child had been harmed or
was in danger).
234. Confronting this problem days after Davis in State v. Mechling, the West
Virginia Supreme Court remanded a case in which a neighbor intervened in a do-
mestic dispute occurring outdoors across the street. State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d
311, 314-15 (W. Va. 2006). Though the neighbor did not witness any physical con-
tact and Mechling fled at his approach, the victim declared Mechling had hit her in
the head. Id. at 315. Appealing his domestic battery conviction, Mechling asserted
this hearsay statement's admission through the neighbor's testimony violated the
Confrontation Clause. Id. at 323. Noting the U.S. Supreme Court's citation to King
v. Brasier, the West Virginia court read Davis as implying that statements to a pri-
vate citizen would be testimonial if they "related 'what happened' as opposed to
what was happening. Id. at 323-24. Deeming the factual record insufficiently de-
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legitimate medical questions, if he is a police agent and no ongoing
medical emergency exists, then the primary purpose of those questions
may be "to prove past events" the provider knows are "potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution. 235
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment argues that under the test articulated in Davis v.
Washington, medical experts consulted to prepare for trial, medical
providers who have a statutory duty to report certain injuries, Sexual
Assault Nurse Examiners, and other state-connected health care pro-
fessionals act as police agents when they question crime victims.
Where this is so, absent unavailability and prior cross-examination,
victims' responses will be inadmissible in victimless prosecutions
unless the victim's medical condition qualifies as an emergency and
the dialogue's primary purpose is to resolve that emergency.236
Viewed broadly, admission of victims' hearsay statements in vic-
timless prosecutions involves tension between competing values of
paramount social importance. The U.S. Constitution guarantees
threshold protections to a citizen accused of a crime, 237 ensuring that
the majority's zeal to punish those who offend moral norms cannot
override fundamental fairness. But if the measure of a just society is
how well it protects its weakest members, then those moral norms
carry heightened force when applied to harms to the most vulnerable,
such as abused children. Crawford and Davis rebalanced the scales of
justice in favor of the former value.
But they did not wholly ignore the latter concern. By emphasizing
the continued vitality of the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing, the
Court assured the Confrontation Clause will not reward intimidation
of victims. 238 "[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial
process by procuring or coercing silence from ... victims, the Sixth
tailed, the court remanded for development of "a thorough record of the circum-
stances surrounding [the witness's] admirable intervention." Id. at 324.
235. Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006).
236. See id. at 2273-74.
237. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIII.
238. See Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2279-80; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
62 (2004).
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Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce. ' '239 The Court im-
plicitly encouraged lower courts "to utilize liberal burdens of proof
and evidentiary standards in making forfeiture determinations., 240 But
courts should exercise this discretion carefully lest they resurrect Rob-
erts's critical flaw in new guise. In domestic violence and child abuse
cases, forfeiture determinations will almost always rely on evidence
concerning the charged offense-for example, proving that a woman's
abuser has intimidated her almost certainly requires explaining her
susceptibility to such intimidation. When the defendant stands accused
of murder, this problem is magnified. A forfeiture hearing should not
become a mini-trial at which the judge effectively adjudicates the de-
fendant's guilt under a lesser standard of proof. If "allow[ing] a jury to
hear evidence, untested by the adversary process, based on a mere ju-
dicial determination of reliability" was bad,241' allowing the jury to
hear such evidence based on a judicial predetermination of guilt would
be far worse. This outcome would "replace[] the constitutionally pre-
scribed method of assessing [guilt in a criminal trial] with a wholly
foreign one., 24 2 In closing one door to unconfronted testimony in
criminal trials, this Comment hopes the Court has opened a window-
not knocked down a wall.
Elizabeth J. Stevens*
239. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.
240. Meier, supra note 60, at 24; see Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280-8 1.
241. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
242. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... .") (emphasis added).
* J.D. Candidate, California Western School of Law, December 2007; B.S.,
Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 2002. I extend my humble thanks to two
individuals whose contributions to this Comment are simply immeasurable: to my
husband, who kept me sane, for his love, support, and unbelievable forbearance; and
to Professor Ruth Hargrove, a true superwoman, for her mentorship, dedication, and
powerful verbs. I owe further thanks to the California Western Law Review staff for
their diligent work in preparing this Comment for publication.
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